The silent Windows install through Microsoft Intune or an IT provider's RMM: the certificate profile, the signed installer, the staged rollout, and updates. macOS summarized.
Updated July 2026
This page is Endpoint Protection's deployment path; Proxara Connect installs nothing and needs none of it. Production device deployment rides the management tooling the firm already operates, and employees see none of it: no installer window, no prompt, no restart request. This page documents the Windows path in full, which is how device pilots deploy. The macOS path is summarized at the end.
Two things reach each Windows device: the firm's certificate profile and the signed agent installer. Both are assigned to a device group, and devices activate themselves.
| Artifact | What it is |
|---|---|
| The trusted-certificate profile | The firm's per-tenant certificate, delivered by Intune into the computer's trusted store. The agent's own service also installs the certificate into the machine store as part of setup, so trust does not hinge on one delivery path. |
| The agent installer | A signed Windows installer (MSI), published as a Required app for a device group. The firm's configuration rides inside it as installer properties: the firm's API endpoint, the tenant name, and a limited enrollment code scoped to the agreed device count. |
A firm that manages its Windows fleet through an IT provider's remote-management tool (an RMM) rather than Intune deploys the same signed MSI the same way: silently, in the system context, with the same installer properties. Nothing in the package is Intune-specific.
The push is staged, and each stage is a gate:
The group is never assigned broadly during validation, and no employee device is enrolled before the gate.
Nothing breaks. The agent detects that its certificate is not trusted, stays in full passthrough, and alerts the operator. Employees notice nothing; the device simply is not covered until trust arrives. The never-block posture in The device proxy applies from first boot.
The production Windows agent captures traffic with a network driver signed by Microsoft through its hardware certification program. The release pipeline refuses to package a driver Microsoft has not signed, so what a fleet receives is exactly what Windows itself verifies at load. The driver holds capture only while the agent is healthy; when it is not, its authorization lapses within seconds and traffic flows natively. Trial and sandbox installs use the operating-system proxy configuration instead and carry no driver, and every device reports which capture mode it runs. Coexistence describes the exact behavior beside the firm's VPN, endpoint security, and filtering.
Production installs receive signed, silent updates: the agent checks the firm's own endpoint, downloads from one pinned release host, verifies the file's hash against what the server declared and then the code signature, and installs without user interaction. Network endpoints lists both destinations.
The console's Overview shows covered devices and AI surfaces, and devices appear in the record as they see their first AI traffic. A device that has been up for a while without appearing usually means the certificate has not landed, which the operator alert will already have said.
The macOS path has the same shape: a signed and notarized package plus a trust profile, pushed through Jamf, Kandji, Intune, or any MDM that can deliver a package and a configuration profile. On supervised or user-approved devices the trust profile lands silently. Pilots run on Windows; a firm with Macs in scope raises it at the review meeting and gets the exact current state rather than a promise.
Single-device validation is the checklist for the first device, Coexistence covers the security stack, Network endpoints lists what to allow, and Rollback and uninstall is the way back out, including the order to remove things in.