Defend your systems from
the attack threat of the future.
A poisoned document, a hijacked prompt, an agent that goes wrong. None of them widens what the firm allowed.
The security reviewAuthority only narrows downward.
Full speed, and nothing opens.
AI does real work across the firm’s systems. The same boundary that lets it move is what shuts these out.
- 01
Prompt injection
A hidden line inside a client PDF tells the assistant to mail the client list out read as text, and text carries no permission
- 02
Tool poisoning
A connected tool rewrites its own description to ask for more than it had the tool list was pinned before the work started
- 03
A rogue agent
An agent asks for a client record outside the work it was registered to run it holds no credential, so the request never lands
- 04
Exfiltration
The assistant is talked into sending a file to an address nobody approved the firm binds the real recipient, and a person releases it
Caught, restricted, refused.
One click restricts an agent. Its next call comes back refused, and everything else keeps working.
The agent registerA coding agent caught, restricted, and refused at the wire.
It tries. It never crosses.
An agent holds no keys.
It gets a name, an owner, the work it may run, and limits. Never a standing credential, never raw identifiers, never arbitrary search.
A child agent can be narrower than its parent. Never broader.
See Agents
Nearly a decade of stopping this.
Hemanth Tadepalli, Founding Advisor and vCISO
- M.S. Cybersecurity, UC Berkeley
- Mandiant, Google, AlixPartners, May Mobility
- Threat intelligence and API security research
Send us the security review.
Tell us what the firm needs answered, and a person will answer it.
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