Eight checks in fixed order, in both directions. Agents act freely. Nothing reaches a tool, and no result reaches the model, without passing through.
Agents now read calendars, draft pull requests, and post to Slack through the Model Context Protocol. It sits in front of every host an agent runs in.
shipped MCP across ChatGPT, Claude, Windows and Azure
Source · WikipediaA client like Claude Desktop or Cursor calls a tool on a server like Slack or GitHub. With Proxara in place, the gateway sits on that path and inspects both directions.
A reverse proxy between any agent and any MCP server. Both ends see no difference. The agent does not know it is there.
Every JSON-RPC message runs the same sequence before it crosses the boundary, sub-microsecond on the hot path. Each stage can stop a bad outcome on its own.
The call is checked on the way out and every result on the way back, and each lands on a single signed audit row that verifies offline.
Every tool call runs the same sequence in fixed order, and each stage can stop a bad outcome on its own. Results run the same checks in reverse on the way back.
The audit chain and cryptographic posture sit on the security page. Security details
[Client_E], never the real value. The default for read tools that do not need a real name.John Smith at the boundary, and the crossing is recorded as its own event.The record is signed and chained. Originals never enter the payload, only hashes do. Auto-tagging links each row to the framework it evidences, and any single row verifies offline without a Proxara service in the path.
The gateway and the device proxy compose. When both run, they share one identity vault, one audit chain, and the same tokens everywhere.
A signed installer ships the gateway and nothing else. The audit chain stays on the device, signed and exportable on demand.
Both surfaces share one identity vault and one audit chain. The token a person gets in their browser is the token Slack receives via Notion through Cursor.
The proxy covers chat surfaces and API calls. The gateway switches on later without changing the audit shape.
A signed installer or a Claude Desktop extension bundle, around three megabytes. No build step.
Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP client picks up the gateway on loopback. The agent sees no difference.
Slack, Notion, GitHub, Linear, Drive. One YAML entry per server, auth and token isolation handled.
A first signed evidence pack opens cleanly in the offline verifier. The chain works from row one.
IT pushes the signed package through Google Workspace or Microsoft 365. Devices pick it up on the next sync, the console configured once for everyone.
A team member installs the bundle and opens Claude Desktop. The connector is live, scoped so the gateway only runs on the work profile.
Tool poisoning, indirect injection, supply-chain RCE, and the lethal-trifecta pattern, with the public CVE catalogue.
Read the threat catalogue CryptographyHow the audit chain is signed and anchored. CBOR canonical, Ed25519 per event, Merkle batched, Sigstore Rekor.
See the security details Sister surfaceOS-layer TLS interception across browsers, terminal agents, IDE copilots, and API calls, on the device.
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