Agents act on instructions hidden inside the tools they call. Proxara inspects every tool call, description, and result, and stops the attack before it reaches the model or the wire.
Sits in front of every MCP host and agent






None of these attacks breaks encryption. None trips a DLP rule. Each turns a tool the agent already trusts into the exfiltration channel, and each meets a layer built to stop it.
The MCP spec puts no restriction on a tool’s description. The interface shows the short name; the model receives the whole description as trusted context and acts on it. Invariant Labs exfiltrated ~/.ssh/id_rsa through a poisoned add tool.
The MCP ecosystem grew faster than its security did. Tool calling went mainstream in a year, and the threat research followed close behind.
A reverse proxy between any MCP host and any downstream server. Nine stages run in fixed order on every tools/call, tools/list, and resources/read. Nothing crosses without passing through.
A Bedrock classifier scans every tool description and result before the model sees it. Authentication checks the actor; nothing else in the stack checks the instructions hidden in the tools the agent already trusts.
A per-session directed graph of every call matches read-then-exfil and leak-then-send shapes, with a 10-call baseline and 3σ deviation flags. The lethal trifecta is caught as a pattern, not a single request.
Privately deployable: a single ~5 MB Rust binary that runs embedded, standalone on :8443, or hosted in your own VPC. Built like security tooling, not a wrapper.
Built for the hot path: a wait-free arc-swap configuration path keeps p99 added latency under 120 ms, inside Claude Desktop’s request budget even on tools/list.
Drops in with no agent changes: every MCP host — Claude Desktop, Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf, ChatGPT Desktop, internal agents — is treated as just another JSON-RPC client. No per-host integration.
The agent gateway is one surface Proxara governs. The rest of the firm runs through the same point.
“The WhatsApp exfiltration ran over WhatsApp’s own encrypted infrastructure. End-to-end encryption was never broken, and DLP saw normal traffic.”

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